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Evidence is reviewed for the existence of a core system for moment-to-moment social communication that is based on the
perception of dynamic gestures and other social perceptual processes in the temporal-parietal occipital junction (TPJ), including
the posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS) and surrounding regions. Overactivation of these regions may produce the
schizophrenic syndrome. The TPJ plays a key role in the perception and production of dynamic social, emotional, and attentional
gestures for the self and others. These include dynamic gestures of the body, face, and eyes as well as audiovisual speech and
prosody. Many negative symptoms are characterized by deﬁcits in responding within these domains. Several properties of this
system have been discovered through single neuron recording, brain stimulation, neuroimaging, and the study of neurological
impairment. These properties map onto the schizophrenic syndrome. The representation of dynamic gestures is multimodal
(auditory, visual, and tactile), matching the predominant hallucinatory categories in schizophrenia. Inherent in the perceptual
signal of gesture representation is a computation of intention, agency, and anticipation or expectancy (for the self and others). The
neurons are also tuned or biased to rapidly detect threat-related emotions. I review preliminary evidence that overactivation of
this system can result in schizophrenia.
1.Introduction
Is there a system for dynamic moment to moment social
communication in the brain? Social perception has now
been extensively studied in humans and nonhuman primates
and is deﬁned as follows: “...the initial states of evaluating
the social communicative intentions of others by analysis of
eye-gaze direction, facial expressions, body movements, and
other types of biological motion.” [1]. Recent evidence
suggests that such a system does exist and that abnormal
activity in this system may produce the symptoms and
cognitive deﬁcits that comprise the syndrome of schizophre-
nia. A posterior system will be described whose activity
may correspond to or underlie the perceptual experience
of conversing and interacting with others. Until recently,
communication has primarily been studied through lan-
guage research. This line of research has focused mainly on
the structure of the representation and the neural basis of
language input (graphemes, phonemes), the internal lexi-
cal/semantic representation, and language output (writing
and speech production) and has made signiﬁcant progress
in understanding language.
2. Communication InvolvesNot Only
LanguageProcessingbutAlsoSocial
CognitiveFunctions
Communication with another individual involves a set of
representations or processes that are outside the scope of
traditional language research. Many of these representational
systems are studied under the rubric of social cognition.
Social communication (in humans) necessitates the dynamic
perception of speech, social-emotional cues, and the produc-
tion of the communicative message (narrative, intonation,
and gestures).
The speech signal that is used to communicate is (pri-
marily) both auditory and visual in nature. In naturalistic
settings, the perception of speech occurs simultaneously
with the dynamic visual perception of gestures, especially2 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
of the face. The audiovisual speech signal not only conveys
meaning through words but also contains information about
emotion (facial expressions and prosody). Perception during
conversation also necessitates a host of other functions that
are crucial for communication. During the rapid interplay of
conversation, the ability to anticipate other’s thoughts and
actions is also essential. Theory of mind is used; this is the
ability to “think about thoughts” and to represent other’s
point of view. The representation of agency (who is doing
what) and intention, both in other’s and in one’s self, are
important.Thecorrectdeploymentofattentionandworking
memory are needed as well as the ability to follow or track
other’s behavior and speech. A narrative of the conversation
must be built up and maintained; this is an understanding of
the context and the story or message that is being conveyed
by the individual words and sentences. During conversation,
meaning is built up not only from words but also from body
and facial gestures as well as intonation (prosody). Recent
evidencesuggeststhattheremaybeasetofbrainareaswhose
functionality matches the representations and processes
needed during moment to moment social communication
[2–6]. The temporal parietal occipital junction or TPJ
(especially in the right hemisphere) is referred to as the
“social brain area” [7] because it has been implicated in
numerousneuroimagingstudiesofsocialcognitivefunctions
such as theory of mind, empathy, social attention, and
other functions [2, 3]. Figures 1 and 2 show the functional
architecture of the TPJ. It has been hypothesized that the TPJ
is involved in lower-level processes associated with empathy,
theory of mind, agency, and attentional orienting to salient
stimuli and that these processes are crucial to higher-level
social function [2] (see Figure 2). The TPJ includes the
inferior parietal region as well as the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (PSTS) and gyrus (note that only the right
hemisphere is shown, but the left TPJ region is also involved
in these functions). The functional territory for the PSTS is
often thought to extend inferiorly to at least the posterior
middle temporal gyrus. The notion that the TPJ is crucial
for social interaction/communication has now been tested
directly in human subjects. A recent naturalistic functional
magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) study of live face-
to-face interaction within an MRI scanner showed strong
evidencethattheTPJisacoreregionformomenttomoment
social interaction [4]. Medial prefrontal regions have also
been hypothesized to play a role in social functioning and
data on this point will be reviewed (predominately in the
later section of the paper).
3. GeneralCharacteristicsandAnatomical
Connections of the TPJ
The PSTS has a major role in the perception of dynamic
gestures. A basic function of the inferior parietal region is in
theformationofintentionsforactionandthisregion(aswell
as the intraparietal sulcus) contains mirror representations
that are active during either the perception or production of
an action [8]. The intraparietal sulcus separates the inferior
and superior parietal lobe. Portions of the intraparietal
Figure 1: Summary ﬁgure of the overlap of functional regions
in the TPJ (inferior parietal and PSTS); this region is involved
in eye gaze (red); audiovisual speech (orange); self-representation
(yellow); theory of mind (green); emotional perception of faces
and prosody (dark blue and purple). Rerepresentation of data is,
respectively, from [37–40, 47].
Reorienting Empathy
Agency Theory of mind
Figure 2: Results of a quantitative meta-analysis of 70 functional
neuroimaging studies. Activation likelihood estimation maps in
the right temporoparietal junction are shown. Colors code the
probability of activation with brighter yellow indicating the highest
activation (reprinted with permission from [2]).
sulcus such as the lateral intraparietal region or LIP are
thought to contain a dynamically constructed saliency map
that is used to guide gestures such as saccades [8–10].
The TPJ and surrounding regions project to the inferior
frontal region and are closely anatomically associated with
hippocampal and insular regions [5, 6, 11]. Interoceptive
and homeostatic body signals activate the insula (including
thirst, sensual touch, sexual arousal, warmth, heartbeat, and
bladder distension) [12]. Subjective ratings of these body
signals correlate most strongly with activation in the anterior
insula and this region has been hypothesized to underlie
emotionalawareness[12].Craig describes theanterior insula
for “feeling emotion and homeostatic and body feelings”Schizophrenia Research and Treatment 3
relative to the anterior cingulate’s limbic motor function or
role in initiating or motivating behavior.
4. SocialCognition Is Abnormal in
Schizophrenia
It is well known that social cognitive deﬁcits form a major
part of the schizophrenic syndrome. Social cognitive deﬁcits
are considered to be a major determinant of functional
outcome for schizophrenic individuals [13]. Social respon-
siveness is aﬀected in schizophrenia; the negative symptoms
include asociality as well as a lack of facial movement, facial
expression, eye contact, and vocal inﬂection (prosody). In
fact the four most prevalent so-called negative symptoms
of schizophrenia are a lack of expressive gestures, a lack
of vocal inﬂection and social inattention, as well as a
general impairment in attention. Schizophrenic individuals
also present with theory of mind deﬁcits and these deﬁcits
are related to a lack of expressiveness [14, 15]. It is also
important to note that internal experiences of emotion and
related sensations (perhaps related to insular function) do
not seem to be as abnormal in schizophrenia as emotional
responsiveness [16, 17].
5. BuildingLinksbetweenthe Syndrome
of Schizophrenia andBrain Dysfunction:
aParsimoniousAccount of Positiveand
Negative Symptoms as Stemming from the
Same,Similar,and/or Adjacent Social
CognitiveModules withinthe TPJ
These negative symptoms and social cognitive deﬁcits could
clearly be described as problems with social communicative
representations or systems. However, I will argue that most,
if not all, of the schizophrenic syndrome can be understood
under the rubric of social communication. Recent advances
in understanding this system will be described and used to
reframe the symptoms of schizophrenia and to then link
them to brain function. It is proposed that the overactivation
of the functional modules in the TPJ that subserve social
communication produces the syndrome of schizophrenia.
Direct evidence for TPJ involvement in schizophrenia will
be presented near the end of the paper. The formulation
presented here is new and remains to be systematically
tested. However there are many lines of evidence that will
be described below here in after. For example, schizophrenic
symptoms are evoked by stimulation to the TPJ [18–21],
electrical brain activity within the TPJ coincides with the
presence and absence of symptoms [22], and the disruption
of TPJ activity alleviates symptoms [23–28].
6. Reframing the SchizophrenicSyndrome and
Evaluating the Evidence for the Involvement
ofthe TPJinSocialProcessing
Understanding aspects of this system at the neural (sin-
gle cell) and systems neuroscience levels may provide a
basis for the understanding the disparate symptoms and
cognitive deﬁcits found in the schizophrenic syndrome.
Several principles were used to guide the construction of
the current framework. Neuroimaging alone cannot provide
evidence for a region’s involvement in a particular function
and taken alone constitutes relatively weak evidence for a
link between a function and a brain region. Lesion studies
must also show that the function is impaired when the
region is damaged. In evaluating human lesion data it is
important to analyze each case individually [29]. The extent
of involvement of other damaged regions should be taken
into account. Data from patients with brain trauma from
head injury or with epilepsy should be viewed with caution
as these patients often have diﬀuse damage that may be
missed in a radiologic examination. Converging evidence
from several sources provides the strongest basis for positing
a relationship between brain and function. For example, in
interpretingfunctionalimagingdata,itisalsoimportantthat
other sources show convergence with the theory, including
brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
and data from neuronal recordings in humans or animals.
Data from single case studies with circumscribed brain
lesions that contradict a speciﬁc theoretical position must be
accounted for and are a serious indictment of the theoretical
position [29]. For each functional domain discussed here in
after, I will cite neuroimaging and lesion data to show that
the TPJ is a core substrate for the function (as well as data
from the other techniques as discussed previously). When
single neuron data are described, I will cite evidence showing
similar ﬁndings from human studies in order to provide
explicit links between cellular properties and systems level
function (a detailed description of all the studies cited here
can be found in [5, 6]).
7. The Phenomenology of the Schizophrenic
Syndrome Reframed
For brevity, this paper will describe the most prominent
symptomsandtheirrelationshiptobrainfunction;adetailed
account for the other symptoms can be found in [6].
Auditory hallucinations of voices are the most prevalent
symptom [30]. Patients have the feeling that someone is
actually there and speaking. Auditory hallucinations can
also take the form of hearing conversations between voices.
Patients will sometimes report that it seems like there is
actually another person or persons in their head. Some types
of auditory hallucinations may be due to a misattribution
of the patient’s thoughts to an outside source (abnormal
agency attribution for the voice). Visual hallucinations of
people in action are the next most prominent category of
hallucination [31]. The most common delusions, delusions
of persecution and delusions of reference, are characterized
by the feeling of being followed, watched, or that people
are secretly communicating using gestures or clothes [32].
The prominent positive symptoms of schizophrenia revolve
around the perception or feeling of an entity that is speaking,
communicating, watching, following, observing, or spying.
Schizophrenia is also characterized by abnormal agency4 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
judgments; patients can feel as though their actions and
thoughts are controlled by an outside force or entity (e.g.,
delusions of control, thought insertion, thought broadcast-
ing). Therefore, the prominent hallucinations and delusions
may be reframed as the misperception of a social entity
or entities or overactivation of representations in the TPJ
that subserve many aspects of dynamic social processing.
Throughout the paper I will review properties of dynamic
social perception and interaction that may be important for
understanding the schizophrenic syndrome. For example,
recent advances in cognitive neuroscience show that the
perception of a social entity is accompanied by an intrinsic
and automatic perception of agency, intention, and social
prediction [33–36]. These functions are intrinsic to the
representation of dynamic action at the single neuron level
[33, 34, 36]. It has also been shown that self and other
processing overlap and the feeling of a presence can also
stem from abnormal activation of the self-representation
[19–21, 37]. The prominent negative symptoms are related
to abnormal social responding and a lack of social expression
or response primarily in the face and voice. The regions
that are used to perceive dynamic social interaction are
also used in the formation of intentions for the production
of social, emotional, and attentional gestures as well as
for theory of mind [2, 7, 38–42]. This reframing of the
syndrome is parsimonious in that it postulates that the
symptoms can be understood as the integrated action of one
region (as opposed to widespread abnormalities or complex
interactions between anterior and posterior regions).
In the following sections, I will describe the functional
architecture (the arrangement or juxtaposition of functional
regions) as well as properties of the neuronal representation
of dynamic social action that can be used to understand the
schizophrenicsyndrome.Thefunctionalcontributionsofthe
TPJhavebeendescribedinseveraldisparatesubﬁeldsofneu-
roscience and cognitive neuroscience that are conceptually
overlapping but motivated by the investigation of diﬀerent
psychologicalfunctions[2,5,6].Indescribingtheseﬁndings,
I will also show how individual schizophrenic symptoms can
be reframed and organized under the rubric of TPJ function.
8.The CommunicativeSignalIs Basedon TPJ
Function, Is Multimodal (Especially Auditory
andVisual),and Carriesan Automatic
Computation of Agency, Intention,and
SocialPrediction
The neural code used by the TPJ reﬂects the fact that
communication occurs not only through auditory language
comprehension but also through gestures that can occur
simultaneously with the speech signal. A basic and promi-
nent function of the TPJ is to represent dynamic gestures,
especially in lateral temporal and inferior parietal regions
centered on the PSTS in humans [42]. Lesions and repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to these regions
impair biological motion perception [43, 44]. The homol-
ogous regions in the monkey have neurons that are multi-
modal and respond to the sight, sound, and somatosensory
aspects of biological motion [41, 45]. Single-cell recordings
in monkeys show that audiovisual representation is the
most predominant type of representation followed by visual-
tactile representation [45]. The PSTS combines information
about biological motion, social/biographical information
and speech [41, 46]. In humans, the representation of audio-
visual speech occupies a large portion of the TPJ territory
(see Figure 1 [47]). These relative proportions match the fact
that hallucinations of voices and the feeling that someone
is speaking predominate in schizophrenia followed by visual
hallucinations of people and then by tactile hallucinations.
Hearing voices also activates the TPJ [48].
Multimodal gesture representations have properties that
allow the neurons to participate in more conceptual func-
tions such as the computation of agency, the ability to keep
track of other’s behavior, and the ability to predict the
actions of others (social prediction) [33, 34, 49–51]. For
example, repetition suppression in the monkey STS creates
a situation in which neurons that are tuned to sequences of
dynamic gestures are maximally responsive to gestures that
are about to occur [33]. Single-cell recordings in monkeys
have shown that these functions are automatically computed
and are an inherent part of the gesture representation at
the single neuron level. Neuroimaging has conﬁrmed that
activity in the PSTS in humans is also modulated by the
perceived intentionality of the gesture or movement [35].
In addition, the human STS was found to be a region in
which interactions occur between observed action and the
reaﬀerent motor-related copy of that action [52].
Hence, overactivation of this dynamic gesture system
could produce the erroneous perception of speech, visual
humanaction(visualhallucinationsofpeople),ortactilehal-
lucinations. Direct evidence for this supposition comes from
the fact that cortical stimulation of the TPJ (in nonpsychotic
individuals) and lateral posterior temporal lobe can result in
visual hallucinations of action scenes involving people [18].
Cortical stimulation of the TPJ can also cause feelings of
limbs or body parts changing shape in nonpsychotic indi-
viduals (e.g., somatosensory hallucinations and delusions
[19]). The overactivation of gesture representations could
be graded so that some patients might experience frank
hallucinations and others might experience a feeling that
there are persons acting, watching, or communicating with
them. In addition, this overactivation would be predicted to
produce a feeling of agency or of an agent with intentions
andwouldbeexpectedtointerferewithsocialpredictionand
social interaction.
Activity in these PSTS/TPJ multimodal neurons that
encode gestures (especially audiovisual gestures) has been
shown in monkeys and humans to provide rapid feedback
excitation(within30msec)tounimodalregionsandtoresult
in gamma synchronization [53]. This phenomenon has been
documented in several studies (reviewed in [5, 6]). Hence,
erroneously activated audiovisual speech representations
may cause the aberrant activation of auditory cortex and
the gamma synchronization of TPJ and primary auditory
regions. This would result in increased attention and activity
in auditory channels.Schizophrenia Research and Treatment 5
9. The TPJ Is a Core Substrate for
Theory of Mind
The TPJ is a core neural substrate for theory of mind
or the ability to understand and represent another’s point
of view or thoughts [39, 54, 55]. Neuroimaging studies
of theory of mind have shown several foci including the
TPJ, the orbital frontal cortex, amygdala, anterior insula,
and medial frontal regions [56]. The medial prefrontal
cortex or the anterior paracingulate cortex—approximately
corresponding to Brodmann area (BA) 9/32—had been
thought to be a key region for theory of mind function
[56]. However, previous reports of an association between
theory of mind, social processing, and the medial prefrontal
cortex have relied on patients with traumatic brain injury
or epilepsy. These types of patient often have diﬀuse brain
damagethatisdiﬃculttodetectinradiologicexams(seeBird
et al. (2004) [57] for a critical discussion of these studies).
There have now been several reports of circumscribed
lesions to the medial prefrontal cortex where the patients
do not show theory of mind impairments [57–60]. Bird et
al. (2004) [57] present a carefully documented case of a
patient whose injury is circumscribed and coincides with
the region identiﬁed in several fMRI studies to be involved
in theory of mind (see Figure 3). This individual did show
impairments in planning and memory as well as a tendency
to confabulate but did not show theory of mind deﬁcits
on any of a battery of tasks [57]. In another study, three
patients with anterior cingulate damage were tested on
theoryofmind, socialsituationprocessing, andmotivational
decision making. Two of the patients had selective anterior
cingulate damage (one also had temporal lobe damage).
These two patients were n o ti m p a i r e di nt h e o r yo fm i n d ,
motivational decision making, or social situation processing
[58].
TPJ lesions do impair theory of mind [60]. In addition,
recent neuroimaging studies have shown that the (right) TPJ
has a response proﬁle that is more selective for theory of
mind than other regions such as the posterior cingulate and
the medial prefrontal cortex. The right TPJ was selectively
involved in the attribution of mental states rather than
reasoningaboutgeneralsociallyrelevantfactsaboutaperson
[54]. The ability to make inferences about mental states
or beliefs and intentions during moral judgments was also
impaired when TMS was applied to the right TPJ [61].
Neurons in the monkey STS that respond to dynamic action
orbiologicalmotionaretunedtorespondtophysicalorvocal
actions that are about to occur or to anticipate action [33,
49]. Aberrant activity in the TPJ would interfere with theory
of mind computations resulting in abnormal or slowed
social behavior. This abnormal activity would also interfere
with dynamic social response and the tracking and hence
understanding of other’s social behavior. These impairments
are core components of the schizophrenic syndrome which
includes symptoms such as asociality and social inattention
as well as theory of mind deﬁcits as described previously
[13–15, 62, 63].
Figure 3: Figure from Bird et al., 2004, showing the lesion site
of a patient with anterior cingulate damage who did not show
theory of mind impairments. Peak activation foci related to theory
of mind from ten diﬀerent neuroimaging studies are shown (boxes)
superimposed onto the lesion site. The ﬁgure shows that a lesion
in the region of the anterior cingulate activated by theory of mind
tasks does not cause impairments on these tasks (reprinted with
permission from [57]).
10. Emotional Perception andReaction
Emotional gesture perception and reaction for the face and
body as well as prosody perception are dependent on the
TPJ, presumably because of its role in voice and gesture
representation (e.g., eyes and face). Emotional perception
and reaction are linked; the perception of facial expressions
produces a subtle version of the expression on the viewer’s
face [64]. The perceptual circuits that are used to perceive
other’s actions are also used to represent and plan our
own actions, and several regions are active during both
observation and imitation of dynamic gestures [7, 64, 65].
Single neurons in the monkey PSTS respond to emotional
gestures [49]. Human neuroimaging studies also show that
the TPJ is involved in emotional gesture and prosody
perception [66, 67]. Lesions within the primary/secondary
somatosensory cortex, supramarginal gyrus (part of inferior
parietal cortex/TPJ), and insula (adjacent and medial to
the TPJ) result in a deﬁcit in the ability to perceive facial
emotion and prosody [40] .T h es u p r a m a r g i n a lg y r u sm a y
be especially important for the creation of the intentions
or plans for emotional and prosodic reaction. Hence, the
overexcitation of emotional gesture perceptual circuits could
interfere with reaction or with the formation of intentions
for facial emotional reaction. This would result in social
unreactivity or asociality as well as a lack of facial movement,
eye contact, vocal inﬂection, and facial expression; these are
all prominent negative symptoms of schizophrenia.
11.Eye Gestures,SocialAttention,andAgency
Movements of the eyes are especially important in social
cognition and communication; they not only convey emo-
tion but also convey the focus of attention. Dynamic
representations of emotional gesture and attention are used
in the perception of more conceptual aspects of social6 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
cognition [35, 68]. The TPJ and especially the posterior STS
and superior temporal regions are core components of a
system for the representation and perception of eye gaze
[38, 69, 70]. The TPJ was shown to be selectively involved
in representing joint or social attention in a neuroimaging
investigation of live social interaction [39]. The perception
of gaze direction and the control of attention via gaze are
impaired with TPJ damage [70, 71]. Aberrant activity in this
system could produce a deﬁcit in the tracking of others eye
gestures resulting in abnormal social attention and hence
social reaction and understanding.
As discussed previously, the perception of intentionality
and agency are an inherent component of the perception of
dynamic gestures, including eye gaze [35, 72–74]. For exam-
ple, in the monkey, neurons in the STS combine information
about gestures of the arm (e.g., reaching) with information
about the direction of gaze (the focus of attention) to
compute agency or intentionality [34]. Overactivation of
gaze and other gesture representations would produce the
qualia not only of a presence (of being watched) but also of
a presence with intentions. This assumption is corroborated
with data; direct cortical stimulation of the TPJ can cause the
feeling of a “shadowy presence” [20].
12. Gesture Neurons Are Tuned to Rapidly
DetectThreat
Another property of gesture representation in the TPJ is
that the neurons in this neural circuit are tuned to rapidly
detect emotionally negative or socially threating gestures.
Theamygdalaismostoftencitedwithregardtothisfunction.
However, amygdala damage does not cause a deﬁcit in the
detection of dynamic body expressions of fear [75, 76]. This
means that there is another brain region that is the core
substrate for this function. Single neuron recording in the
monkey STS showed that the neurons are tuned or biased
to detect potentially threatening biological motion [41].
Event-related potential (ERP) and neuroimaging studies in
humans have conﬁrmed that the TPJ is used to perceive
threating or emotionally negative gestures [41, 77]. Hence,
although this region is generally used to perceive dynamic
gestures, there is a neural tuning for the detection of social
threat. Hence, overactivation of these gesture representations
might produce the feeling of being in a socially threating
situation. This feeling could be a component of delusions of
persecution and other symptoms.
13. Self-Representation, Embodiment,
and Agency
The perception of self-made gestures from our own visu-
ospatial perspective and the corresponding auditory, visual,
tactile, and vestibular information resulting from actions
may provide the concrete scaﬀolding that is used to create
and sustain the self-representation or the feeling of being an
embodied, thinking, and acting person [37]. There are also
more ﬁxed body schemas that are presumably constructed
through experience and that are used in the dynamic
representationoftheself(thesearealsolocatedinthevicinity
of the TPJ—in the intraparietal sulcus and the secondary
somatosensory cortex; see [6] for a summary). Our sense of
self is so evident and constant that it may be surprising to
learn that it is actually a perceptual construct. However, this
construct can break down and be demonstrably associated
with certain neural circuits in the same way as other psycho-
logical functions such as memory and language. Changes in
the feeling of embodiment can be aﬀected by manipulating
visual-somatosensory percepts that are represented within
the TPJ, by stimulation of the TPJ, or by lesions in the TPJ
[37, 78]. For example, the experimental manipulation of
visuospatialperspective andsimultaneous tactilestimulation
can cause the feeling of inhabiting a diﬀerent body or body
swapping [79]. Stimulation or lesion in the TPJ region can
cause out-of-body experiences and other changes in the
feeling of embodiment [19]. For example, a patient (Susan)
with right temporoparietal damage was reported who had a
“Capgras syndrome for her mirror image” [80]( s e ep a g e s
73–75). This patient used sign language and was observed
communicating with the person in the mirror (her own
reﬂection). She believed that there was this other “Susan” in
the mirror who had the same background, appearance, and
age and went to the same school as she did (but she did not
know her in school). The other Susan was judged to be a bit
slower and not as good at sign language as the real Susan.
The regions and representations that are used to repre-
sent the self overlap with those that are used to represent
others (see detailed discussion in [6, 37, 81]). The regions
that are thought to compute the self-representation are also
activatedbytheperceptionofdynamicvisual(gesture),audi-
tory, or somatosensory stimulation from others, including
the TPJ, somatosensory cortex, secondary somatosensory
cortex, the extrastriate body area, the intraparietal sulcus,
and ventral premotor regions [42, 82]. For example, the
secondary somatosensory area responds to touch regardless
of whether it was felt on one’s own skin or seen on
another [83]. Most of the functional components that
have been identiﬁed with self-representation in the TPJ are
modulated by auditory, visual, and tactile inputs and hence
overactivationofthesechannelswouldbeexpectedtodisturb
the self-representation [6].
Abnormal feelings of agency and of a presence could
also occur as a result of a disturbance of the TPJ self-
representation (reviewed in [5, 6]). The bulk of the experi-
mental evidence shows that abnormal activity in TPJ regions
and vestibular cortex (insula/inferior parietal lobe) can
producethesephenomena[21].Heautoscopy,theexperience
of an alternate self or Doppelganger, is associated with either
abnormal activity or damage in the TPJ [21]. Visual hallu-
cinations of people are the second most prominent type of
hallucination in schizophrenia and may arise from abnormal
activation of the self-representation. When the body double
is seen (visual hallucination), the visual appearance may or
may not mirror the person’s own image, but the imitation of
body gestures by the double can produce the feeling that the
double contains the real mind. The experience of the self can
be perceived to arise from the body double or can alternate
between the physical body and the body double. This typeSchizophrenia Research and Treatment 7
of hallucination can also be experienced as a feeling of a
presence or multiple presences of closely projected doubles
that are not visible [21]. This feeling of a presence has
been induced by electrical stimulation of the PSTS region
[20]. Aberrant activation of the self-representation would
be expected to interfere with feelings of embodiment and
agency for one’s thoughts and actions as is seen in symptoms
such as delusions of control and could also produce the
qualia (feeling of a presence) associated with delusions of
persecution, delusions of jealousy, and delusions of reference
or visual hallucinations.
Several neuroimaging studies of schizophrenia have
shown that abnormal agency processing in patients is related
to overactivation in (especially the right) IP or TPJ (reviewed
in [5, 84]). For example, one study of agency processing
found abnormal activity in the right inferior parietal region
in schizophrenic subjects and this overactivation was also
positively correlated with the Schneiderian score [85].
14.The MedialandOrbitalFrontalRegions,
SocialCognition,andSelf-Representation
Impairments in self-awareness related to abnormal activity
in midline structures have been hypothesized to play a role
in the social processing problems that have been identiﬁed
in schizophrenia [86]. Several central and medial regions
of the brain, including those in the frontal lobe (medial
orbital, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the anterior
cingulate cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex), have been
theorized to be involved in self-referential processing and
self-reﬂection [87, 88]. The evidence for this supposition
comes mainly from neuroimaging studies where central
midline regions have been found to show activity in tasks
such as the recall of personal information, the assessment
of self-personality traits, appearance, attitudes, or feelings
[87, 88]. Gillihan and Farah (2005) [89], in a critical review
of this literature, noted that confounding factors were not
adequately controlled in many of these studies. A recent
study used TMS to disrupt processing and to probe the
brain response to self-related stimuli with non-self-related
stimuli. Superior performance on self-related items (the self-
reference eﬀect) was found. TMS to left and right parietal
cortex suppressed the self reference eﬀect, but no eﬀects
on the self-reference eﬀect were found with TMS to the
m e d i a lp r e f r o n t a ll o b e[ 90]. It was discussed previously how
patients with circumscribed and well-documented medial
frontal lesions do not present with a deﬁcit in social situation
processing nor have deﬁcits in self-related processing been
reported [57, 58, 91]. Confabulation is known to occur with
frontal lobe damage [80]. The current framework assumes
thatdelusionsarenotconfabulationsbutratherexplanations
of bizarre sensory phenomena as suggested by Brendan
Maher (2006) [92].
The dorsal anterior cingulate has previously been associ-
ated with action monitoring or the monitoring of response
conﬂict and in cognitive control (see review in [93]). This
functionisthoughttobeusedinsocialsituations[87,93,94].
However, there are now several reports of individuals with
circumscribedlesionsofthisarea.Theseindividualshavenot
been found to have deﬁcits in tasks used to measure response
conﬂict such as the Stroop nor in behavioral measures
of cognitive control; see for example, [91]. In fact, recent
evidence suggests that the dorsal anterior cingulate response
to errors may be more related to levels of negative aﬀect
during task performance than to response conﬂict [95].
These results are consistent with the view that the dorsal
anterior cingulate plays a role in the control of autonomic
responses that accompany cognitive eﬀort (see review in
[91]). The dorsal anterior cingulate may be involved in
response selection based on reward contingencies; data from
single unit studies in monkeys and in humans and further
lesion data from humans undergoing cingulotomy support
this hypothesis (see review in [91]). The dorsomedial aspect
of the prefrontal cortex may have a role in empathy, in
representing emotional pain in others, and/or in the ability
to use emotional pain or negative consequences to constrain
behavior [96]. Although empathy and theory of mind scores
are correlated, the precise relationship between them is
unclear [57]. A recent FMRI study found that the anterior
middle cingulate cortex responded to both emotionally and
physically painful events, while the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex responded selectively to emotional pain [96]. A lack
of empathy does not seem to be central to schizophrenia,
although it is a symptom of the manic phase of bipolar
disorder.
Orbital and ventral medial frontal lesions also do not
cause theory of mind deﬁcits [97] but rather result in an
acquired sociopathy [98]. Orbital and ventral medial frontal
lobe damage has generally been reported to result in a lack
of empathy, euphoria, irresponsibility, a lack of concern
f o rt h ef u t u r e ,a n dal a c ko fc o n c e r nf o rs o c i a lr u l e s[ 97–
99]. When tested explicitly on measures of social judgment
and responding, individuals with orbital and inferior medial
frontal lesions present with an intact knowledge of social
rules and the ability to judge the outcomes [98]. However,
their autonomic responses to socially meaningful stimuli
may be abnormal and it is has been hypothesized that
these patients fail to activate somatic (body emotional)
states in response to social stimuli [99]. Another report
surmised that orbital damage results in a reduced ability to
use the expectation of negative emotional reactions (anger)
to constrain behavior [97]. Recently it has been reported
that orbitofrontal lesions cause a diminished sensitivity to
varying reward magnitudes [100]. These data are consistent
with single unit recordings in monkeys showing neuronal
responses that were associated with various aspects of
reward computed from experience with behavioral choices
[101]. It is claimed that damage to the orbital and ventral
medial prefrontal cortex leads to an inability to “develop
a coherent model of one’s own self” and hence emotional
liability and aberrant social functioning [87]. However, the
function of orbital and ventral medial frontal cortices has
been repeatedly shown to be related to an inability to use
negative emotions to constrain behavior or to competently
compute and use reward or punishment outcomes. This
syndrome seems more closely aligned with mania where
decision making is impaired and individuals often do risky8 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
things without regard to the emotions of others (manic
symptoms include euphoria, lack of empathy, impulsiveness,
lack of concern for consequences of behavior and for social
rules) and manic patients sometimes confabulate as is seen
in patients with frontal lobe lesions [80].
In summary, medial prefrontal regions have been shown
to be activated during tasks assessing theory of mind and
self related processing; this presupposes a role for these
regions in social processing. Anterior cingulate regions show
coactivation with the TPJ in many neuroimaging studies
and hence abnormal activity in the TPJ could be expected
to aﬀect activity in this region. However, as yet there are
many competing theories concerning the role of this part
of the system and hence it is unclear what the functional
consequences of abnormal activity would be and what form
they would take (overactivation, lack of activation).
15. Direct Evidencefor TPJ Involvement
inSchizophrenia
It is hypothesized that the TPJ (and primary eﬀerent areas)
should show slightly elevated baseline activity interposed
withepochsofhyperactivationthatcorrespondtotheabnor-
mal qualia (hallucinations and delusions) and responsive
deﬁciencies (negative symptoms) seen in schizophrenia [5,
6, 102]. Although it is not often acknowledged (perhaps
because of the almost axiomatic belief in frontal lobe
abnormalities), there is strong evidence for TPJ involvement
in psychosis and schizophrenia. Activity has been recorded
in the TPJ that corresponds to the experience of symptoms,
activity has been found that is correlated with symptoms,
and recent large-scale morphometric studies show volume
reductions in the TPJ in schizophrenia. Torrey [103]w r o t e
an extensive review of the evidence for inferior parietal
involvement in schizophrenia that includes an account of
the relationship between prodromal symptoms and parietal
function (we will not reiterate that evidence here). The
TPJ region is a relatively anatomically variable region and
hence volume abnormalities could be relatively diﬃcult
to detect; the inferior parietal region is one of the last
regions in the brain to be myelinated and develops into
late adolescence [104]. However, recently two large-scale
morphometric studies of schizophrenic volume reductions
have been published. Both of these studies show core
reductions in TPJ volumes [105, 106]. Direct evidence for
abnormal activity in the TPJ during psychosis comes from
brain recordings; right inferior parietal activity was related a
delusional state in a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study
[22]. When the abnormal activity subsided, the delusions
subsided. Correspondingly, interference with TPJ activity
alleviates schizophrenic symptoms. At ﬁrst TMS was applied
to the TPJ to treat auditory hallucinations; at least 6
published studies have now shown that TMS applied to the
TPJalleviatesauditoryhallucinationsandsomereportsshow
reductions in other symptoms as well [23–28]. For example,
in one study schizophrenic subjects with treatment-resistant
auditory hallucinations were given daily rTMS treatments
for 10 days and showed a reduction in the frequency of
auditory hallucinations and an improvement in many other
symptoms [23].
Data from our previously published studies have consis-
tently supported TPJ involvement; schizophrenic symptoms
such as auditory hallucinations and thought disorder were
correlated with levels of FMRI activity in the inferior parietal
and superior temporal sulcus in several studies [107–109].
One of the most systematic FMRI symptom capture studies
of schizophrenia was one of a single schizophrenic subject
who heard voices for approximately 26 seconds and then
no voices for approximately 26 seconds; this periodicity is
relativelyoptimalforanFMRIdesign[110].FMRIactivation
was detected surrounding the PSTS approximately 3 seconds
prior to the conscious detection of the auditory hallucina-
tion. Activation of the inferior parietal and inferior frontal
regions followed. The PSTS activation (which extended into
the superior and middle temporal regions) was persistent
through the entire experience. This coincides with the
unusualextended neuralresponses (e.g.,7 seconds) recorded
in monkey STS neurons that are activated by dynamic
multimodal gestures [49].
TPJ over-activation could stem from a number of causes,
but it is hypothesized that in schizophrenia the source
is most often from over-activation of the hippocampal
system [111]. The activity of the hippocampus shows a
high association or correlation with activity in the TPJ (so-
called default mode or cortical hub activity) and evidence
fromepilepticindividualsshowsthatabnormalhippocampal
activity underlies active psychosis and that the TPJ region
is also involved [6]. Note that resting state abnormalities
have been repeatedly found in schizophrenia and that a
seed placed within the hippocampus will produce activity in
most of the “default mode” regions [112–115]( s e e[ 6]f o ra
detailed discussion of hippocampal involvement).
16. Summary
In summary, the regions that make up the TPJ form a core
system for the perception and production of emotional face
a n db o d yg e s t u r e sa sw e l la sp r o s o d y .T h i sr e g i o ns h o w s
functional activity that indicates that it is preferentially
involved in the perception of narrative (versus words or
sentences) [3]. This area is a core component for the
perception of social attention or of the process of joint
attention (the deployment of attention according to social
and communicative cues). This area is also the core region
in the brain for theory of mind or understanding other’s
intentions and thoughts. The neural activity in this system is
biased to detect or anticipate future multimodal social acts,
or in other words to anticipate speech and actions. Inherent
in the representation of multimodal gestures is a coding of
intention and agency. Even though this system is used for the
perception and production of biological motion or gestures,
there is a neural bias or tuning for the rapid identiﬁcation
of social threat and parts of the TPJ are core components
of fear perception (reviewed in [5, 6]). The TPJ not only
represents other’s actions but may also be a core area for
representing the self. This is the only region of the brain thatSchizophrenia Research and Treatment 9
produces verbal memory deﬁcits when damaged and hence
is the neural substrate for verbal working memory (reviewed
in [5, 6]). Since neural activity in this region corresponds
to social perception and joint attention, over-activation of
this region could result in the erroneous perception of
being within a dynamic social situation. Over-activation of
this region would have widespread consequences for many
domains including social perception, social reactivity, and
attention.
When the consistency and weight of the evidence is
considered, the characteristics of TPJ function more closely
matchthesymptomsofschizophrenia.Hippocampalactivity
hasbeenconsistentlyshowntobeabnormalinschizophrenia
which is highly correlated with both TPJ and anterior cingu-
late/paracingulate activity [113–115]. The characteristics of
medial prefrontal function (especially from the lesion data)
may match those of bipolar disorder more closely than those
of schizophrenia.
Conﬂict of Interests
The authors declare that this paper was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential conﬂict of interests (6,
2950-2967).
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by an NIMH Grant 1 R01
MH067080-01A2 andbytheHarvardNeuro-Discovery Cen-
ter (formally HCNR). It was funded also by the Biomedical
Informatics Research Network (U24RR021992), National
Institute of Mental Health. The author would like to thank
Israel Molina for help with the paper.
References
[1] T. Allison, A. Puce, and G. McCarthy, “Social perception
from visual cues: role of the STS region,” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, vol. 4, no. 7, pp. 267–278, 2000.
[2] J. Decety and C. Lamm, “The role of the right temporopari-
etal junction in social interaction: how low-level computa-
tional processes contribute to meta-cognition,” Neuroscien-
tist, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 580–593, 2007.
[3] E. Redcay, “The superior temporal sulcus performs a com-
mon function for social and speech perception: implications
for the emergence of autism,” Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 123–142, 2008.
[4] E.Redcay,D.Dodell-Feder,M.J.Pearrowetal.,“Liveface-to-
face interaction during fMRI: a new tool for social cognitive
neuroscience,” NeuroImage, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 1639–1647,
2010.
[5] C. G. Wible, A. P. Preus, and R. Hashimoto, “A cognitive
neuroscience view of schizophrenic symptoms: abnormal
activation of a system for social perception and communica-
tion,” Brain Imaging and Behavior, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 85–110,
2009.
[6] C. G. Wible, “Hippocampaltemporal-parietal junction inter-
action in the production of psychotic symptoms: a frame-
work for understanding the schizophrenic syndrome,” In
press.
[7] J. Decety and J. Grezes, “The power of simulation: imagining
one’s own and other’s behavior,” Brain Research, vol. 1079,
no. 1, pp. 4–14, 2006.
[8] J. Gottlieb, “From thought to action: the parietal cortex as a
bridge between perception, action, and cognition,” Neuron,
vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 9–16, 2007.
[9] J. T. Klein, R. O. Deaner, and M. L. Platt, “Neural correlates
of social target value in macaque parietal cortex,” Current
Biology, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 419–424, 2008.
[ 1 0 ]K .G .T h o m p s o na n dN .P .B i c h o t ,“ Av i s u a ls a l i e n c em a pi n
the primate frontal eye ﬁeld,” Progress in Brain Research, vol.
147, pp. 251–262, 2005.
[11] T. Brandt, P. Bartenstein, A. Janek, and M. Dieterich,
“Reciprocal inhibitory visual-vestibular interaction. Visual
motion stimulation deactivates the parieto-insular vestibular
cortex,” Brain, vol. 121, no. 9, pp. 1749–1758, 1998.
[12] A.D.Craig,“Howdoyoufeel—now?Theanteriorinsulaand
human awareness,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 10, no.
1, pp. 59–70, 2009.
[13] D. C. Javitt, “When doors of perception close: bottom-up
models of disrupted cognition in schizophrenia,” Annual
Review of Clinical Psychology, vol. 5, pp. 249–275, 2009.
[14] M. Brune, M. Abdel-Hamid, C. Sonntag, C. Lehmkamper,
and R. Langdon, “Linking social cognition with social
interaction: non-verbal expressivity, social competence and
“mentalising”inpatientswithschizophreniaspectrumdisor-
ders,” Behavioral and Brain Functions, vol. 5, article 6, 2009.
[15] N. C. Andreasen, C. A. Calarge, and D. S. O’Leary, “Theory
of mind and schizophrenia: a positron emission tomography
study of medication-free patients,” Schizophrenia Bulletin,
vol. 35, no. 5, p. 1030, 2009.
[ 1 6 ]A .M .K r i n g ,S .L .K e r r ,D .A .S m i t h ,a n dJ .M .N e a l e ,“ F l a t
aﬀect in schizophrenia does not reﬂect diminished subjective
experience of emotion,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, vol.
102, no. 4, pp. 507–517, 1993.
[17] A.M.KringandE.K.Moran,“Emotionalresponsedeﬁcitsin
schizophrenia: insights from aﬀective science,” Schizophrenia
Bulletin, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 819–834, 2008.
[18] W. Penﬁeld and P. Perot, “The brain’s record of auditory and
visual experience: a ﬁnal summary and discussion,” Brain,
vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 595–696, 1963.
[19] O. Blanke, S. Ortigue, T. Landis, and M. Seeck, “Stimulating
illusory own-body perceptions,” Nature, vol. 419, no. 6904,
pp. 269–270, 2002.
[20] S. Arzy, M. Seeck, S. Ortigue, L. Spinelli, and O. Blanke,
“Induction of an illusory shadow person,” Nature, vol. 443,
no. 7109, article 287, 2006.
[21] P. Brugger, O. Blanke, M. Regard, D. T. Bradford, and T.
Landis, “Polyopic heautoscopy: case report and review of the
literature,” Cortex, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 666–674, 2006.
[22] R. Ishii, L. Canuet, M. Iwase et al., “Right parietal activation
during delusional state in episodic interictal psychosis of
epilepsy: a report of two cases,” Epilepsy and Behavior, vol.
9, no. 2, pp. 367–372, 2006.
[23] S. H. Lee, W. Kim, Y. C. Chung et al., “A double blind
study showing that two weeks of daily repetitive TMS over
the left or right temporoparietal cortex reduces symptoms
in patients with schizophrenia who are having treatment-
refractory auditory hallucinations,” Neuroscience Letters, vol.
376, no. 3, pp. 177–181, 2005.10 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
[24] E. Poulet, J. Brunelin, B. Bediou et al., “Slow transcranial
magnetic stimulation can rapidly reduce resistant auditory
hallucinations in schizophrenia,” Biological Psychiatry, vol.
57, no. 2, pp. 188–191, 2005.
[25] R. E. Hoﬀman, R. Gueorguieva, K. A. Hawkins et al., “Tem-
poroparietal transcranial magnetic stimulation for auditory
hallucinations: safety, eﬃcacy and moderators in a ﬁfty
patient sample,” Biological Psychiatry, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 97–
104, 2005.
[26] A. Vercammen, H. Knegtering, R. Bruggeman et al., “Eﬀects
of bilateral repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
on treatment resistant auditory-verbal hallucinations in
schizophrenia: a randomized controlled trial,” Schizophrenia
Research, vol. 114, no. 1–3, pp. 172–179, 2009.
[27] O. Rosenberg, Y. Roth, M. Kotler, A. Zangen, and P. Dannon,
“Deep transcranial magnetic stimulation for the treatment
of auditory hallucinations: a preliminary open-label study,”
Annals of General Psychiatry, vol. 10, no. 1, article 3, 2011.
[28] R. Jardri, B. Lucas, Y. Delevoye-Turrell et al., “An 11-year-old
boy with drug-resistant schizophrenia treated with temporo-
parietal rTMS,” Molecular Psychiatry, vol. 12, no. 4, article
320, 2007.
[29] A. Caramazza, “On drawing inferences about the structure
of normal cognitive systems from the analysis of patterns of
impaired performance: the case for single-patient studies,”
Brain and Cognition, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–66, 1986.
[30] D. Silbersweig and E. Stern, “Functional neuroimaging of
hallucinations in schizophrenia: toward an integration of
bottom-up and top-down approaches,” Molecular Psychiatry,
vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 367–375, 1996.
[31] J. Gauntlett-Gilbert and E. Kuipers, “Phenomenology of
visual hallucinations in psychiatric conditions,” Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease, vol. 191, no. 3, pp. 203–205,
2003.
[32] M. Startup and S. Startup, “On two kinds of delusion of
reference,” Psychiatry Research, vol. 137, no. 1-2, pp. 87–92,
2005.
[ 3 3 ]D .I .P e r r e t t ,D .X i a o ,N .E .B a r r a c l o u g h ,C .K e y s e r s ,a n d
M. W. Oram, “Seeing the future: natural image sequences
produce anticipatory neuronal activity and bias perceptual
report,” QuarterlyJournalofExperimentalPsychology,vol.62,
no. 11, pp. 2081–2104, 2009.
[34] T. Jellema, C. I. Baker, B. Wicker, and D. I. Perrett, “Neural
representation for the perception of the intentionality of
actions,” Brain and Cognition, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 280–302,
2000.
[35] J. P. Morris, K. A. Pelphrey, and G. McCarthy, “Perceived
causality inﬂuences brain activity evoked by biological
motion,” Social Neuroscience, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 16–25, 2008.
[36] D. I. Perrett, P. A. Smith, D. D. Potter et al., “Visual cells in
thetemporalcortexsensitivetofaceviewandgazedirection,”
ProceedingsoftheRoyalSocietyB,vol.223,pp.293–317,1985.
[37] O. Blanke and S. Arzy, “The out-of-body experience: dis-
turbed self-processing at the temporo-parietal junction,”
Neuroscientist, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 16–24, 2005.
[38] L. Nummenmaa, L. Passamonti, J. Rowe, A. D. Engell, and
A. J. Calder, “Connectivity analysis reveals a cortical network
for eye gaze perception,” Cerebral Cortex,v o l .2 0 ,n o .8 ,p p .
1780–1787, 2010.
[39] L. Young, D. Dodell-Feder, and R. Saxe, “What gets the atten-
tion of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation
of attention and theory of mind,” Neuropsychologia, vol. 48,
no. 9, pp. 2658–2664, 2010.
[40] R. Adolphs, H. Damasio, and D. Tranel, “Neural systems
for recognition of emotional prosody. A 3-D lesion study,”
Emotion, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 23–51, 2002.
[41] A.PuceandD.Perrett,“Electrophysiologyandbrainimaging
of biological motion,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B, vol. 358, no. 1431, pp. 435–445, 2003.
[42] K. A. Pelphrey, J. P. Morris, C. R. Michelich, T. Allison,
and G. McCarthy, “Functional anatomy of biological motion
perception in posterior temporal cortex: an fMRI study of
eye, mouth and hand movements,” Cerebral Cortex, vol. 15,
no. 12, pp. 1866–1876, 2005.
[ 4 3 ]J .B i l l i n o ,D .I .B r a u n ,K .D .B o h m ,F .B r e m m e r ,a n dK .
R. Gegenfurtner, “Cortical networks for motion processing:
eﬀects of focal brain lesions on perception of diﬀerent
motion types,” Neuropsychologia, vol. 47, no. 10, pp. 2133–
2144, 2009.
[44] E.D.Grossman,L.Battelli,andA.Pascual-Leone,“Repetitive
TMS over posterior STS disrupts perception of biological
motion,” Vision Research, vol. 45, no. 22, pp. 2847–2853,
2005.
[45] C. Bruce, R. Desimone, and C. G. Gross, “Visual properties
of neurons in a polysensory area in superior temporal sulcus
of the macaque,” Journal of Neurophysiology, vol. 46, no. 2,
pp. 369–384, 1981.
[46] M. I. Gobbini and J. V. Haxby, “Neural systems for recogni-
tion of familiar faces,” Neuropsychologia,v o l .4 5 ,n o .1 ,p p .
32–41, 2007.
[47] T. M. Wright, K. A. Pelphrey, T. Allison, M. J. McKeown,
and G. McCarthy, “Polysensory interactions along lateral
temporal regions evoked by audiovisual speech,” Cerebral
Cortex, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 1034–1043, 2003.
[48] K. V. Kriegstein and A.-L. Giraud, “Distinct functional
substrates along the right superior temporal sulcus for the
processingofvoices,”NeuroImage,vol.22,no.2,pp.948–955,
2004.
[49] N. E. Barraclough, D. Xiao, C. I. Baker, M. W. Oram, and D.
I. Perrett, “Integration of visual and auditory information by
superior temporal sulcus neurons responsive to the sight of
actions,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 17, no. 3, pp.
377–391, 2005.
[50] M. S. Beauchamp, “Statistical criteria in fMRI studies of
multisensory integration,” Neuroinformatics,v o l .3 ,n o .2 ,p p .
93–113, 2005.
[51] M. S. Beauchamp, B. D. Argall, J. Bodurka, J. H. Duyn,
and A. Martin, “Unraveling multisensory integration: patchy
organizationwithinhumanSTSmultisensorycortex,”Nature
Neuroscience, vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 1190–1192, 2004.
[52] M. Iacoboni, L. M. Koski, M. Brass et al., “Reaﬀerent copies
of imitated actions in the right superior temporal cortex,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, vol. 98, no. 24, pp. 13995–13999, 2001.
[53] A. A. Ghazanfar, C. Chandrasekaran, and N. K. Logothetis,
“Interactions between the superior temporal sulcus and
auditory cortex mediate dynamic face/voice integration in
rhesus monkeys,” Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 28, pp. 4457–
4469, 2008.
[54] R. Saxe and A. Wexler, “Making sense of another mind: the
role of the right temporo-parietal junction,” Neuropsycholo-
gia, vol. 43, no. 10, pp. 1391–1399, 2005.
[55] J.Scholz,C.Triantafyllou,S.Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli,E.N.Brown,
and R. Saxe, “Distinct regions of right temporo-parietal
junction are selective for theory of mind and exogenous
attention,” PLoS ONE, vol. 4, no. 3, Article ID e4869, 2009.Schizophrenia Research and Treatment 11
[56] C. D. Frith and U. Frith, “How we predict what other people
are going to do,” Brain Research, vol. 1079, no. 1, pp. 36–46,
2006.
[57] C. M. Bird, F. Castelli, O. Malik, U. Frith, and M. Husain,
“The impact of extensive medial frontal lobe damage on
“Theory of Mind” and cognition,” Brain, vol. 127, no. 4, pp.
914–928, 2004.
[58] A. Baird, B. K. Dewar, H. Critchley, S. J. Gilbert, R. J.
Dolan, and L. Cipolotti, “Cognitive functioning after medial
frontal lobe damage including the anterior cingulate cortex:
a preliminary investigation,” Brain and Cognition, vol. 60, no.
2, pp. 166–175, 2006.
[ 5 9 ]L .J .B a c h ,F .H a p p e ,S .F l e m i n g e r ,a n dJ .P o w e l l ,“ T h e o r y
of mind: independence of executive function and the role
of the frontal cortex in acquired brain injury,” Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 175–192, 2000.
[60] D. Samson, I. A. Apperly, C. Chiavarino, and G. W.
Humphreys, “Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for
representing someone else’s belief,” Nature Neuroscience, vol.
7, no. 5, pp. 499–500, 2004.
[61] L. Young, F. Cushman, M. Hauser, and R. Saxe, “The neural
basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral
judgment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
United States, vol. 104, no. 20, pp. 8235–8240, 2007.
[62] Y. Sarfati, M. C. Hardy-Bayle, C. Besche, and D. Wid-
locher, “Attribution of intentions to others in people with
schizophrenia: a non- verbal exploration with comic strips,”
Schizophrenia Research, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 199–209, 1997.
[63] Y. Sarfati, M. C. Hardy-Bayle, E. Brunet, and D. Wid-
locher, “Investigating theory of mind in schizophrenia: inﬂu-
ence of verbalization in disorganized and non-disorganized
patients,” Schizophrenia Research, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 183–190,
1999.
[64] U. Dimberg, M. Thunberg, and K. Elmehed, “Unconscious
facial reactions to emotional facial expressions,” Psychological
Science, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 86–89, 2000.
[65] L. Carr, M. Iacoboni, M. C. Dubeaut, J. C. Mazziotta, and
G. L. Lenzi, “Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans:
a relay from neural systems for imitation to limbic areas,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, vol. 100, no. 9, pp. 5497–5502, 2003.
[66] J.Narumoto,T.Okada,N.Sadato,K.Fukui,andY.Yonekura,
“Attention to emotion modulates fMRI activity in human
rightsuperiortemporalsulcus,”CognitiveBrainResearch,vol.
12, no. 2, pp. 225–231, 2001.
[67] D. I. Leitman, D. H. Wolf, J. D. Ragland et al., “‘It’s not
what you say, but how you say it’: a reciprocal temporo-
frontal network for aﬀective prosody,” Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, vol. 4, article 19, 2010.
[68] S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, and T. Jolliﬀe, “Is there a
“language of the eyes”? Evidence from normal adults, and
adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome,” Visual Cognition,
vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 311–331, 1997.
[69] M.V.Lombardo,B.Chakrabarti,E.T.Bullmoreetal.,“Shared
neural circuits for mentalizing about the self and others,”
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 22, no. 7, pp. 1623–
1635, 2010.
[70] T. Akiyama, M. Kato, T. Muramatsu, F. Saito, S. Umeda,
and H. Kashima, “Gaze but not arrows: a dissociative
impairment after right superior temporal gyrus damage,”
Neuropsychologia, vol. 44, no. 10, pp. 1804–1810, 2006.
[71] N. Boddaert, N. Chabane, H. Gervais et al., “Superior tem-
poralsulcusanatomicalabnormalitiesinchildhoodautism:a
voxel-based morphometry MRI study,” NeuroImage, vol. 23,
no. 1, pp. 364–369, 2004.
[72] K.A.Pelphrey,R.J.Viola,andG.McCarthy,“Whenstrangers
pass: processing of mutual and averted social gaze in the
superior temporal sulcus,” Psychological Science, vol. 15, no.
9, pp. 598–603, 2004.
[ 7 3 ]R .S a x e ,D .K .X i a o ,G .K o v a c s ,D .I .P e r r e t t ,a n dN .K a n -
wisher, “A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus
responds to observed intentional actions,” Neuropsychologia,
vol. 42, no. 11, pp. 1435–1446, 2004.
[74] J. Schultz, H. Imamizu, M. Kawato, and C. D. Frith,
“Activation of the human superior temporal gyrus during
observation of goal attribution by intentional objects,”
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 1695–
1705, 2004.
[ 7 5 ]A .P .A t k i n s o n ,A .S .H e b e r l e i n ,a n dR .A d o l p h s ,“ S p a r e d
ability to recognise fear from static and moving whole-body
cuesfollowingbilateralamygdaladamage,”Neuropsychologia,
vol. 45, no. 12, pp. 2772–2782, 2007.
[76] C. Cristinzio, K. N’Diaye, M. Seeck, P. Vuilleumier, and D.
Sander, “Integration of gaze direction and facial expression
inpatientswithunilateralamygdaladamage,”Brain,vol.133,
no. 1, pp. 248–261, 2010.
[77] J. Grezes, S. Pichon, and B. De Gelder, “Perceiving fear in
dynamic body expressions,” NeuroImage,v o l .3 5 ,n o .2 ,p p .
959–967, 2007.
[78] E. L. Altschuler and V. S. Ramachandran, “Last but not least:
asimplemethodtostandoutsideoneself,”Perception,vol.36,
no. 4, pp. 632–634, 2007.
[79] V. I. Petkova and H. H. Ehrsson, “If I were you: perceptual
illusion of body swapping,” PLoS ONE, vol. 3, no. 12, Article
ID e3832, 2008.
[80] T. E. Feinberg, Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self,
Oxford University Press, 2001.
[81] M. Tsakiris, “My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model
of body-ownership,” Neuropsychologia,v o l .4 8 ,n o .3 ,p p .
703–712, 2010.
[82] K. J. Wheaton, J. C. Thompson, A. Syngeniotis, D. F.
Abbott, and A. Puce, “Viewing the motion of human body
parts activates diﬀerent regions of premotor, temporal, and
parietal cortex,” NeuroImage, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 277–288,
2004.
[ 8 3 ] C .K e y s e r s ,B .W i c k e r ,V .G a z z o l a ,J .L .A n t o n ,L .F o g a s s i ,a n d
V. Gallese, “A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the
observation and experience of touch,” Neuron, vol. 42, no.
2, pp. 335–346, 2004.
[84] S.A.Spence,D.J.Brooks,S.R.Hirsch,P.F.Liddle,J.Meehan,
a n dP .M .G r a s b y ,“ AP E Ts t u d yo fv o l u n t a r ym o v e m e n t
in schizophrenic patients experiencing passivity phenomena
(delusions of alien control),” Brain, vol. 120, no. 11, pp.
1997–2011, 1997.
[85] C. Farrer, N. Franck, C. D. Frith et al., “Neural correlates of
action attribution in schizophrenia,” Psychiatry Research, vol.
131, no. 1, pp. 31–44, 2004.
[ 8 6 ]D .J .H o l t ,B .S .C a s s i d y ,J .R .A n d r e w s - H a n n ae ta l . ,
“An anterior-to-posterior shift in midline cortical activity
inschizophrenia during self-reﬂection,” Biological Psychiatry,
vol. 69, no. 5, pp. 415–423, 2011.
[87] G. Northoﬀ, A. Heinzel, M. de Greck, F. Bermpohl, H.
Dobrowolny, and J. Panksepp, “Self-referential processing in
our brain—a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self,”
NeuroImage, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 440–457, 2006.
[88] L. T. Rameson, A. B. Satpute, and M. D. Lieberman,
“The neural correlates of implicit and explicit self-relevant
processing,” NeuroImage, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 701–708, 2010.12 Schizophrenia Research and Treatment
[89] S. J. Gillihan and M. J. Farah, “Is self special? A critical review
of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive
neuroscience,” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 131, no. 1, pp. 76–
97, 2005.
[90] H. C. Lou, B. Luber, A. Stanford, and S. H. Lisanby, “Self-
speciﬁcprocessinginthedefaultnetwork:asingle-pulseTMS
study,”ExperimentalBrainResearch,vol.207,no.1-2,pp.27–
38, 2010.
[91] L. K. Fellows and M. J. Farah, “Is anterior cingulate cortex
necessary for cognitive control?” Brain, vol. 128, no. 4, pp.
788–796, 2005.
[92] B. A. Maher, “The relationship between delusions and
hallucinations,” Current Psychiatry Reports,v o l .8 ,n o .3 ,p p .
179–183, 2006.
[93] D. M. Amodio and C. D. Frith, “Meeting of minds: the
medial frontal cortex and social cognition,” Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 268–277, 2006.
[94] G. Northoﬀ, “Self and brain: what is self-related processing?”
Trends Cognitive Science, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 186–187, 2011,
Author reply 187–188.
[95] R. P. Spunt and M. D. Lieberman, “An integrative model
of the neural systems supporting the comprehension of
observedemotionalbehavior,”NeuroImage,v ol.59,no .3,pp .
3050–3059, 2012.
[96] E. G. Bruneau, A. Pluta, and R. Saxe, “Distinct roles of the
“Shared Pain” and “Theory of Mind” networks in processing
others’ emotional suﬀering,” Neuropsychologia, vol. 50, no. 2,
pp. 219–231, 2012.
[97] R. J. Blair and L. Cipolotti, “Impaired social response
reversal. A case of ’acquired sociopathy’,” Brain, vol. 123, no.
6, pp. 1122–1141, 2000.
[98] J. L. Saver and A. R. Damasio, “Preserved access and process-
ing of social knowledge in a patient with acquired sociopathy
due to ventromedial frontal damage,” Neuropsychologia, vol.
29, no. 12, pp. 1241–1249, 1991.
[99] A. R. Damasio, D. Tranel, and H. Damasio, “Individuals
with sociopathic behavior caused by frontal damage fail to
respond autonomically to social stimuli,” Behavioural Brain
Research, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 81–94, 1990.
[100] J. Kim, E. Yang, L. Overhalser et al., “Orbitofrontal cortex
lesions disrupt adaptation of choice-behavior to varying
aﬀective context in economic decision-making,” In press.
[101] J. W. Kable and P. W. Glimcher, “The neurobiology of
decision: consensus and controversy,” Neuron,v o l .6 3 ,n o .6 ,
pp. 733–745, 2009.
[102] D. H. Ffytche, R. J. Howard, M. J. Brammer, A. David,
P. Woodruﬀ, and S. Williams, “The anatomy of conscious
vision: an fMRI study of visual hallucinations,” Nature
Neuroscience, vol. 1, no. 8, pp. 738–742, 1998.
[103] E. F. Torrey, “Schizophrenia and the inferior parietal lobule,”
Schizophrenia Research, vol. 97, no. 1–3, pp. 215–225, 2007.
[104] N. Geschwind, “Disconnexion syndromes in animals and
man,” Brain, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 237–294, 1965.
[105] R. A. Honea, A. Meyer-Lindenberg, K. B. Hobbs et al.,
“Is gray matter volume an intermediate phenotype for
schizophrenia?Avoxel-basedmorphometrystudyofpatients
with schizophrenia and their healthy siblings,” Biological
Psychiatry, vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 465–474, 2008.
[106] J. M. Segall, J. A. Turner, T. G. Van Erp et al., “Voxel-based
morphometric multisite collaborative study on schizophre-
nia,” Schizophrenia Bulletin, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 82–95, 2009.
[107] S. D. Han, P. G. Nestor, M. Hale-Spencer et al., “Functional
neuroimaging of word priming in males with chronic
schizophrenia,” NeuroImage, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 273–282,
2007.
[108] C. G. Wible, K. Lee, I. Molina et al., “FMRI activity
correlated with auditory hallucinations during performance
of a working memory task: data from the FBIRN consortium
study,” Schizophrenia Bulletin, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 47–57, 2009.
[109] R. I. Hashimoto, K. Lee, A. Preus, R. W. McCarley, and C.
G. Wible, “An fMRI study of functional abnormalities in
the verbal working memory system and the relationship to
clinicalsymptomsinchronicschizophrenia,”CerebralCortex,
vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 46–60, 2010.
[110] B. R. Lennox, S. Bert, G. Park, P. B. Jones, and P. G. Morris,
“Spatial and temporal mapping of neural activity associated
with auditory hallucinations,” The Lancet, vol. 353, no. 9153,
p. 644, 1999.
[111] S. A. Schobel, N. M. Lewandowski, C. M. Corcoran et
al., “Diﬀerential targeting of the CA1 subﬁeld of the hip-
pocampal formation by schizophrenia and related psychotic
disorders,” Archives of General Psychiatry,v o l .6 6 ,n o .9 ,p p .
938–946, 2009.
[112] A. G. Garrity, G. D. Pearlson, K. McKiernan, D. Lloyd,
K. A. Kiehl, and V. D. Calhoun, “Aberrant “default mode”
functional connectivity in schizophrenia,” American Journal
of Psychiatry, vol. 164, no. 3, pp. 450–457, 2007.
[113] J. L. Vincent, A. Z. Snyder, M. D. Fox et al., “Coherent spon-
taneous activity identiﬁes a hippocampal-parietal memory
network,”JournalofNeurophysiology,vol.96,no.6,pp.3517–
3531, 2006.
[114] R. L. Buckner, J. Sepulcre, T. Talukdar et al., “Cortical
hubs revealed by intrinsic functional connectivity: mapping,
assessment of stability, and relation to Alzheimer’s disease,”
Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 1860–1873, 2009.
[115] M. F¨ ocking, P. Dicker, J. A. English, K. O. Schubert, M.
J. Dunn, and D. R. Cotter, “Commonproteomic changes
in the hippocampus in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder
and particular evidence for involvement of cornu ammonis
regions 2 and 3,” Archives of General Psychiatry,v o l .6 8 ,n o .5 ,
pp. 477–488, 2011.